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Britain’s Approach to Balancing Counter-Terrorism Laws with
Human Rights
Abstract
This paper examines the UK's approach to balancing counter-terror laws with human rights
and civil liberties after 9/11. Since then, a litany of legislation has been passed that some
human rights commentators have labeled as overzealous and draconian. Because of the
glut of counter-terror laws instituted, only a fraction of the provisions contained within
them will be reviewed including, indefinite detentions, stop and search rights, passport
seizures, and Temporary Exclusion Orders. The potential for government abuse of farreaching legislation is also highlighted through a case study of Miranda v. the Secretary of
State for the Home Department and others. Part II analyzes how terrorism cases are dealt
with through the UK's judicial system, along with the UK's contentious interaction with the
European Court of Human Rights. The author finds that, although the UK possesses a
robust legislative process with many checks and balances for countering the threat of
terrorism, it should not compromise its international and domestic legal obligations in its
search for security, or else risk losing its reputation as a model democracy, and potentially
isolate disaffected communities even further.
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Introduction
The government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain has a long history of
exercising its powers to counter terrorism, dating back to the 1700s when it
would remove civil liberties such as the right to habeas corpus as a means of
dealing with subversion.1 Targeted legislation aimed at ending terrorism
would not come until much later in the form of the Prevention of Violence Act
of 1938. Although terrorism was not defined in this law, its primary purpose
was to curb terrorist violence in Northern Ireland following threats from the
Irish Republican Army (IRA) of a wide reaching “terror offensive" across the
United Kingdom. The bill was hastened through parliament in less than a
week, and gave police in Northern Ireland the power to stop and search
without warrant, register terror suspects, and deny travel.2 This law would
stay in existence until 1954, despite being introduced as a “temporary
measure.”3 Two decades would pass until the United Kingdom would have a
dedicated anti-terror law in the form of the Prevention of Terror Act of 1974
(PTA 1974), which introduced the notion of proscribed organizations (groups
designated by the government as terrorist organizations).4 The PTA 1974 also
presented the first definition of terrorism that would form the basis for
subsequent laws. Part III (9.1) of the act describes terrorism as, “the use of
violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of
putting the public or any section of the public in fear.”5 This definition,
although a narrower version of the description we see today, presented
terrorism as solely politically motivated in order to counter the threat posed
by the IRA.
After the September 11 (9/11) attacks on the United States and the subsequent
introduction of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, the
United Kingdom hurriedly updated its recently introduced Terrorism Act
2000 (TA 2000) to reflect the challenges and responsibilities presented by the
new “Global War on Terrorism” (GWOT). Since 2001–especially following
the 7 July (7/7) London bombings–a litany of anti-terror laws have been

Simon Bronitt, Andrew Brynes, and Miriam Gani, et al., "The United Kingdom Human
Rights Act and the Terrorist Threat," Fresh Perspectives on the ‘War on Terror’ (May,
2016): 331, available at:
http://press.anu.edu.au/war_terror/mobile_devices/ch15s02.html.
2 “1939 Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act," Schedule 7, May 3, 2016,
available at: http://www.schedule7.org.uk/history/1939-prevention-of-violence.
3 Ibid.
4 Bronitt, Brynes, and Gani, et al., “The United Kingdom Human Rights Act,” 332.
5 Fionnuala McKenna, "Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974," CAIN,
available at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/pta1974.htm.
1
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introduced that many human rights commentators have denounced as
draconian and ill-balanced due to their wide-reaching capabilities and the
potential for such laws to encroach on civil liberties, including the right to
privacy and freedom of speech. Due to the amount of legislation introduced,
this article will only examine a fraction of the most controversial provisions
contained within them, in order to discern whether or not U.K. anti-terror
laws have substantially eroded civil liberties and human rights unnecessarily,
or whether they have been proportionate with respect to countering the threat
posed by terrorism.
This article is divided into two parts. Part I will cover counter-terror laws
introduced since 2000, to include the Terrorism Act 2000 (TA 2000), the
Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act of 2001 (ATCSA), the Terrorism Act
2006 (TA 2006), and the Counter Terrorism and Security Act of 2015 (CTSA
2015). The article will also examine some of the most controversial provisions
within these laws, such as Section 44 and Schedule 7 stop and search powers,
indefinite detention, freedom of speech concerns, passport seizures, and
temporary exclusion orders (TEOs). Furthermore, the potential for abuse of
counter-terror laws by the government is explored by reviewing Miranda v.
the Secretary of State for the Home Department and others. Part II will look
at the United Kingdom’s approach to dealing with terrorism cases in its
domestic courts, and review the Special Immigration Appeals Commission
(SIAC) process, as well as the contentious interaction between the U.K. legal
system and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) to survey the
challenges faced in balancing human rights with security needs. The author
finds that the United Kingdom has a highly accountable legal system with a
vigorous set of anti-terror laws at its disposal. Yet it must be mindful of
encroaching on civil liberties and human rights to the point that anti-terror
laws become counterproductive, and possibly, encourage homegrown
terrorism even further. When developing new legislation, the British
Government must engage with the British Muslim community on a greater
level than it has done in the past to ensure anti-terror laws do not
unintentionally marginalize this minority population even further. In
addition to reforms of the SIACs, the United Kingdom must continue to
uphold its international legal obligations. Not only is this essential for
protecting the integrity of the British legal system, but also to exhibit to the
world that the United Kingdom will remain an exemplar democracy,
regardless of the threat from terrorism.
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Part I: Ramifications of Counter-Terrorism Laws
The Terrorism Act 2000 and the Definition of Terrorism
Legislators in the United Kingdom recognized that a new definition for
terrorism was needed to reflect the modern terror threat facing the state and
the public, and so amended the PTA 1974 definition in the TA 2000 Act to
provide a wider reaching scope than before.6 As of 2001, terrorism is
described as:
“The use or threat of action [the key word action, as defined by Section
1 (2) of the Terrorism Act 2000, means to cause serious violence
against a person, serious damage to property, endanger life, create a
serious risk to the health and safety of the public or section of the
public, or is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt
an electronic system] designed to influence the government or an
international governmental organization or to intimidate the public or
a section of the public, and the use or threat is made for the purpose of
advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.”7
In addition to the expansion of the definition to include religious, racial, and
ideological causes, the law also gave police forces a broad jurisdiction to fight
terrorism, both domestically, and internationally.8

Stop and Search Powers
In the TA 2000 Act, stop and search powers were extended to geographical
areas and could be used by law enforcement without suspicion. Inciting
terrorism through the proliferation of material and preaching hate is now a
prosecutable offense, along with contributing or seeking training for use in
terrorism. 9 However, it was Section 44 (stop and search rights) powers that
generated discord due to the increase in racial profiling—one was between
“five and seven times more likely to be stopped” if black or of Asian
ethnicity—and added to the public perception that police would abuse their

“Q and A: Anti-Terrorism Legislation," BBC News, October 17, 2003, available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3197394.stm.
7 The Terrorism Act 2000, 2000 c. 11, Section 1, available at:
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/1#section-1-1-b.
8 BBC News, “Q and A.”
9 Ibid.
6
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powers.10 Nevertheless, given the propensity for terrorists to hide and lay
dormant among the population, and their flexibility in delaying and bringing
forth attacks, law enforcement personnel are at a distinct disadvantage when
countering terrorists, in comparison to “ordinary criminals” as Lord Carlile of
Berrie, Queen’s Council (QC) points out in his report to parliament.11
Examining the stop and search statistics further highlights the difficulty
police forces face. According to the Home Office, males have committed 92%
of terrorism-related offenses, of which Asian males have made up a large
proportion of those arrested. 12 The figures also show that 76% of those
arrested identify as British, which not only shows the pervasiveness of
homegrown terrorism, but also the challenge presented to police officers in
identifying terror suspects.13 The ability for police to stop and search suspects
in troubled areas is vital given the figures and evidence. Section 44 rights
may be inconvenient to the public, but as Lord Carlile contends, given the
unpredictable nature of terrorism, “the powers are necessary and very useful
in the investigation, early disruption and detection of terrorism.”14

The Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act 2001
Indefinite Detention
Following 9/11, the U.K. government passed the Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and
Security Act of 2001 (ATCSA) two months after the second reading that would
not only change and add to what types of attacks constitute terrorism, but
would also introduce an unprecedented set of laws that would encroach on
civil liberties and basic human rights.15 The most conspicuous of these was

"Section 44 Terrorism Act," Liberty, available at: https://www.liberty-humanrights.org.uk/human-rights/justice-and-fair-trials/stop-and-search/section-44terrorism-act.
11 Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., “The Definition of Terrorism,” March, 2007: 23, available
at:
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228
856/7052.pdf 24 27.
12 “Arrests, outcomes and stops and searches, quarterly update to 31 December 2014,” The
Home Office, June, 2015, available at:
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/operation-of-police-powers-under-theterrorism-act-2000-quarterly-update-to-december-2014/operation-of-police-powersunder-the-terrorism-act-2000-and-subsequent-legislation-arrests-outcomes-and-stopsand-searches-quarterly-update-to-31-d.
13 Ibid.
14 Lord Carlile, “The Definition of Terrorism,” 28.
15 "A-Z of Legislation: Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001," The Guardian
(January 19, 2009) available at:
10
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the “indefinite detention without charge or trial of foreign nationals”
provision (repealed in 2006).16 This provision was reserved for foreign
nationals suspected of terrorism or having terrorist links who could not be
deported to their country of origin. The debated law was not only deemed
discriminatory, but was also recognized to have contravened two parts of the
Human Rights Act of 1998,17 yet, was passed based on Article 15 derogation
rights. The two articles in question were Article 5 (the right to liberty and
security) and Article 6 (the right to a fair trial) which state:
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge
or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall
be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending
trial.”18
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial
tribunal established by law.”19
The shock of 9/11 and the realization of the threat that terrorism posed to
Western society led to the institution of legislation that, while intrusive, was
deemed necessary by policymakers as the gravity of the threats being faced
were ascertained. Consequently, the speed at which the ATCSA 2001 bill was
passed did come under some critique from the Home Affairs Committee,
which declared:
“We question whether it is appropriate for this Bill to be passed
through the House of Commons in exactly two weeks with only three
days of debate on the floor of the House. A Bill of this length - 125
clauses and eight schedules covering 114 pages - with major
implications for civil liberties should not be passed by the House in
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/libertycentral/2009/jan/13/antiterrorism-act.
16 Ibid.; Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, 2001 c. 24, Part 4, Section 33,
available at:
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/24/section/33.
17 “A-Z of Legislation.”
18 “Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,” Articles
5, 6, & 15, European Convention on Human Rights, available at:
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.
19 Ibid.
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such a short period and with so little time for detailed examination in
committee.”20
The rapid passage of the bill shortened the time necessary for a thorough
examination of the new legislation, and continued the trend for reactive
counter-terror laws, but more concerning were the provisions that resulted in
derogations from international treaties like the European Convention on
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). Furthermore, it was noted that the bill seemed to place the rights of
British citizens above that of foreign nationals, with John Wadham, the
director of the human rights organization Liberty, exclaiming:
“What seems to be being suggested by the Government and in this Bill
is that we can somehow avoid the usual presumption of innocence
which will apply to British citizens and that because these people are
foreigners we can lock them up for indefinite periods.”21
Though the practice was unfair, the unique situation surrounding some of
these detainees and the questionable interrogation techniques practiced by
many of the detainees’ countries of origin meant that many of them could not
be deported. Furthermore, the government could not be assured that terror
suspects would be prevented from “fighting another day” if expatriated.
Meanwhile, the seriousness of the potential for harm to the general public
from their release–detainees were declared a national security risk since
British security services could not guarantee they would be able to monitor
them sufficiently–meant that the detention of these potentially dangerous
persons was the only viable option.22 Prudently, the law did include sunset
provisions that would require renewal after 15 months, and then annually
thereafter. In the meantime, Special Immigration Appeals Commissions were
made available to detainees to hear cases that could not be processed through
the civil courts for national security reasons.23

“Parliamentary Consideration of Terrorism Legislation,” The House of Commons,
November 15, 2001, available at:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmhaff/351/35102.ht
m.
21 Ibid., 25.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., 34.
20
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The Terrorism Act of 2006
Freedom of Speech Concerns: The Glorification of Terror
The Terrorism Act of 2006 (TA 2006) was introduced following the 7/7
London bombings and amended the TA 2000 Act. New offenses were
introduced such as inciting or encouraging terrorism, the possession of
terrorist publications, and the glorification of terrorism. The bill asserts:
“…statements that are likely to be understood by members of the
public as indirectly encouraging the commission or preparation of
acts of terrorism or Convention offences include every statement
which glorifies [“glorification”, according to TA 2006, includes any
form of praise or celebration, and cognate expressions are to be
construed accordingly] the commission or preparation (whether in
the past, in the future or generally) of such acts; and is matter from
which that person could reasonably be expected to infer that what
is being glorified is being glorified as conduct that should be
emulated by him in existing circumstances…”24
With the TA 2000 Act, any person found to have directly or indirectly, by
oral/written inferences or statements, encouraged the commission of terrorist
acts, or glorified previous acts, is liable to criminal charges. Additionally,
anyone found to have disseminated/created terrorist publications, trained or
obtained the skills necessary for terrorist acts, could also be indicted under
the bill. Most notably, this bill also applies electronically, in order to include
offenses conducted by persons on social media.25
Organizations like the National Council for Civil Liberties (Liberty) decried
the law as being ill thought out averring that the vagueness of the language
coupled with the outlawing of speech of this kind was contrary to democratic
ideals, and that limiting speech “threatens to make careless talk a crime.”26
The limiting of such speech is understandable given the need to avert social
unrest and prevent the radicalization of vulnerable sections of society.

Terrorism Act 2006, 2006 c. 11., Part 1, available at:
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/11/part/1.
25 Ibid.
26 "Free Speech and Protest," National Council for Civil Liberties, available at:
https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/human-rights/free-speech-and-protest.
24
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However, lawmakers should consider the wider implications of limiting
speech on democracy, and its effect on extreme groups that may go
underground. Furthermore, limiting speech threatens academia and
collegiality between students at educational institutions across the land who
may become fearful of being misinterpreted, or worse still, being brought up
on terror charges.27 Critics of the legislation also declared that those
defending freedom fighters across the world could be implicated under the
new law, with some citing Nelson Mandela’s fight against apartheid as an
example of a just cause that would be outlawed under the new regulation.28
Despite this valid point, it would later be harder to justify post 9/11 because of
the common consensus concerning terrorism as aberrant to international
standards following UN Resolution 1373–not to mention the difficulty in
justifying the criteria for who constitutes a freedom fighter, and who does
not.29

Miranda v. the Secretary of State for the Home Department and Others
The wide scope of anti-terrorism laws and the restriction on certain freedoms
from their institution raises the question if they are too far-reaching and
vulnerable to abuse by the authorities. An often-cited example of this is the
perceived encroachment on journalistic rights. In 2013, two Guardian
newspaper employees, David Miranda and Glenn Greenwald, were covering
the Edward Snowden leaks. Miranda (Mr. Greenwald’s assistant), travelling
to Rio de Janeiro from London, Heathrow, and carrying 58,000 classified
files on an encrypted hard drive obtained from Snowden was detained at
Heathrow airport under the T2000 Act, Schedule 7, for the maximum nine
hours allowed by the law.30
In Miranda v. the Secretary of State for the Home Department and others,
the court considered three questions. Firstly, if the use of Schedule 7 to
apprehend Miranda was appropriate given the provision’s intended use as an
anti-terrorism apparatus; secondly, if law enforcement personnel carried out
Schedule 7 in a proportionate manner; and thirdly, whether the seizure of the
Simon Jeffery, "Q&A: The Glorification of Terrorism," The Guardian (February 15,
2006) available at:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/feb/15/qanda.terrorism.
28 Ibid.
29 Lord Carlile, “The Definition of Terrorism,” 44.
30 Owen Bowcott, "David Miranda Allowed to Appeal Against Ruling on Heathrow
Detentio," The Guardian (May 15, 2014) available at:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/15/david-miranda-appeal-high-courtruling-detention-heathrow.
27
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files constituted a violation of the right to free expression under the European
Convention on Human Rights. 31 The court found that the officer who carried
out the Schedule 7 procedure was justified to stop Miranda, regardless of the
prompt from security services, with the judge pronouncing:
“As I have noted, the proper exercise of the Schedule 7 power does not
require that the examining officer have any grounds whatever “for
suspecting that a person falls within section 40(1) (b) (Schedule 7
paragraph 2(4)); and the Schedule 7 purpose is not to determine
whether the subject is, but only whether he “appears to be” a
terrorist.”32
The court also discussed the checks and balances in place to prevent the abuse
of Schedule 7 procedures by law enforcement like the “good faith” of the
officer, the authority to stop based on the definition of terrorism under TA
2000 Section 1. 9(c), the sanctioned use of Schedule 7 at ports of entry, and
the time limitation of 9 hours. 33
The second point the court considered was whether the use of counter-terror
laws were permissible in order to retrieve stolen government data, which the
court found was in the U.K. government’s authority to do. Witnesses from the
security services stated that preventing political embarrassment was not the
purpose of the stop. They averred that the nation’s security was at stake, not
only because of the potential leak of new email intercept technology, but also
because the lives of security officers and members of the public were at risk if
the files Miranda was carrying were released. In the eyes of the security
services, the Schedule 7 stop would have been the only way to retrieve the files
in Miranda’s possession. 34
The broadness of the definition of terrorism in the TA 2000 Act was also
brought into question by Miranda, only for the judges to confirm that the
definition was intentionally broad, asserting, “For the reasons given by Lord
Lloyd, Lord Carlile and Mr. Anderson, the definition of ‘terrorism’ was indeed
intended to be very wide.”35 The court also addressed claims by the defendant
Mr Justice Ouseley, Mr Justice Openshaw, “Judgment: R (Miranda) v Secretary of
State for the Home Department” High Court of Justice (2014): 2-34, available at:
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wpcontent/uploads/JCO/Documents/Judgments/miranda-v-sofshd.pdf.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
31
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that the seizure of the files inhibited the freedom of the press and encroached
on the public interest because, in its opinion, the national interest outweighed
that right. The court also recognized that Miranda was not a journalist per se
in its statement:
“The claimant was not a journalist; the stolen GCHQ intelligence
material he was carrying was not ‘journalistic material,’ or if it was,
only in the weakest sense. But he was acting in support of Mr
Greenwald’s activities as a journalist. I accept that the Schedule 7 stop
constituted an indirect interference with press freedom, though no
such interference was asserted by the claimant at the time. In my
judgment, however, it is shown by compelling evidence to have been
justified.”36
The court also reviewed the European Convention on Human Rights (Article
10) argument and found that, under English law, Schedule 7 rights did not
overstep its bounds, reminding the court that “the executive never enjoys
unfettered power,”37 as accountability and transparency are found throughout
the legal process by way of independent review.38 Miranda’s claim that
Schedule 7 violated his privacy and his journalistic rights was rebutted with
the defense citing previous cases like Beghal v. the Department of Public
Prosecutions39 that held that Schedule 7 was not in violation of human rights
and that the European Convention on Human Rights/European Court of
Human Rights did not support unconditional journalistic rights.40

Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015
Most recently, the United Kingdom passed the Counter-Terrorism and
Security Act of 2015 that received Royal Assent (in Britain, Royal Assent
formally turns a proposed bill into a law) three months after its first reading.41
It contained new provisions intended to aid law enforcement in countering
suspected terrorists including a faster process for the seizure of passports,
and the introduction of Temporary Exclusion Orders.42

Ibid.
Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, c. 6, available at:
http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2014-15/counterterrorismandsecurity.html.
42 Ibid.
36
37
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Power to Seize Travel Documents
The U.K. government can now seize the passports of U.K. or non-U.K.
nationals of any age who are suspected of travelling in support of terrorism
overseas for up to 30 days. Previous legislation put law enforcement at a
disadvantage as obtaining the authority to seize travel documents through the
court system could often be lengthy and require Home Secretary approval.43
Recent figures released from Europol show that 3000-5000 fighters from
Europe are suspected to have travelled to and from Syria in 2014, and 500 of
those have been from the United Kingdom, underscoring the need to take
measures to counter the flow of European fighters to the so-called Islamic
State (IS).”4445 The new powers mean that the delay provides sufficient time
for officers to conduct investigations relating to the suspect.46 But, as with
most counterterrorism laws, the wording used to justify using this new
authority is vague. According to the Home Office:
“The threshold for exercising the power is that the police officer has
reasonable grounds to suspect that the person is at the port with the
intention of leaving Great Britain or the United Kingdom for the
purpose of involvement in terrorism related activity outside the United
Kingdom.”47
Meanwhile, power to stop travelers comes “as a result of intelligence or on the
basis of observation or information obtained at port,”48 raising fears that
racial profiling will again become an issue since the likelihood of being
stopped if of Asian ethnicity is “between 1.5 and 2.5 times the rate for White
people.”49 Nonetheless, checks and balances have been built into the bill to
Matthew Holehouse, "Counter-terrorism Bill: What It Contains," The Telegraph
(November 26, 2014) available at:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11254950/Counterterrorism-Bill-What-it-contains.html.
44 “European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2015,” Europol (2015): 22,
available at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/european-union-terrorismsituation-and-trend-report-2015.
45 Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, Factsheet: Temporary Passport Seizure, The
Home Office (December 3, 2014) available at:
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/382
245/CTS_Bill_-_Factsheet_2_-_Passport_Seizure.pdf
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Isabella Sankey, “Liberty’s Second Reading Briefing on the Counter-Terrorism and
Security Bill in the House of Lords,” Liberty (January, 2015): 5, available at:
https://www.liberty-humanrights.org.uk/sites/default/files/Liberty's%20Briefing%20on%20the%20Counter43
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prevent the arbitrary use of seizure powers. For instance, officers are
required to seek permission from senior officers before conducting a stop
(senior officers themselves are also inspected), and will have their stops
reviewed after 72-hours. A code of conduct has also been introduced for
border officers.50 Liberty has also made the government aware that children
and foreign nationals may be at particular hardship financially if suspicions
are proven wrong. The resulting disruption to travel and the knock-on effects
to one’s private life could be detrimental to one’s wellbeing and safety.51 On
balance, the passport seizure provisions seem necessary given the flow of
naturalized U.K. citizens travelling for the purposes of terrorism. For
example, naturalized citizen Mohammed Emwazi–nicknamed “Jihadi John”
by the press–hailed from West London and travelled to Kuwait and Tanzania
before eventually travelling to Syria to join IS–despite being monitored by
MI5 for five years before joining.52 Although it was a failing by the security
services, having the ability to have disrupted his travel plans by restricting his
movement through seizure of travel documents not only could have prevented
the further radicalization of this person, and prevented the deaths of Western
journalists, it could have also sent a strong message to others contemplating
similar actions.53

Temporary Exclusion Orders
Lastly, Temporary Exclusion Orders (TEOs) authorize the government to
prevent anyone suspected of engaging in terrorism from returning to the
United Kingdom for a period of up to two years, and are renewable.54 This
provision targets British citizens (provisions were previously reserved for
those with dual nationality or naturalized citizens in order to avoid rendering
the individual stateless–an act that is illegal under international law) who
were previously impervious to efforts from the government to exclude them
from returning following travel for the purpose of terrorism.55 Besides
sidestepping the issue of statelessness, another notable gap in this provision
Terrorism%20%20Security%20Bill%20(Second%20reading%20HOL)%20(Jan%20201
5).pdf
50 Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, Factsheet: Temporary Passport Seizure, 3.
51 Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, Factsheet: Temporary Passport Seizure, 5.
52 “‘Jihadi John’: Prime Minister Defends Security Services,” BBC News (February 27,
2015) available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-31657281.
53 Ibid.
54 The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015.
55 Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, Factsheet: Temporary Exclusion Orders,
available at:
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/382
346/CTS_Bill_-_Factsheet_3_-_TEO.pdf.
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is that anyone issued a TEO because of “travel for the purpose of terrorism”
may be vulnerable to questionable treatment by the country to which the
person is exiled. Countries battling insurgencies and terrorism such as
Nigeria, Kenya, and Turkey have security services that are known to practice
harsh interrogation techniques; thus, the person on the receiving end of the
TEO, having been identified to non-U.K. authorities, is at risk of abuse by the
security services of their host nation.56
Although one might suggest that a person losing the right to return to the
United Kingdom after engaging in such acts (not to mention the threat posed
by their return) justifies the denial of entry on the surface; in reality, TEOs
can complicate matters further. For example, TEOs put the United Kingdom
at risk of further violating its obligations under international law by
contravening the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the European Convention on
Human Rights.57 Notwithstanding a potential breach of international law and
the disregard for a person’s freedom to travel, the TEO effectively puts the
onus of handling suspects onto another, possibly less capable country that
could simply release the exiled individual and allow him or her to “fight”
another day. Moreover, blocking an individual’s return limits the ability of
U.K. intelligence services to monitor terror suspects for any terror-related
activity by placing that individual out of reach.58
This section reviewed major anti-terror legislation, beginning with the
Prevention of Violence Act of 1934, and noted the evolution of the definition
of terrorism, from its original focus on politically motivated acts, to
encompassing religious and ideological drivers as seen in the TA 2000 Act.
The fast-pace at which subsequent laws were passed in reaction to terrorist
threats was also examined, underscoring the flexibility of the U.K. legal
system. However, the swift passage of legislation like the Indefinite Detention
provisions in the Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act 2001, due to the
urgency of the terror threat, resulted in the passing of overzealous legislation
in some instances. The United Kingdom has shown its commitment to UN
resolution 1373 through its implementation of strong anti-terror laws and
support of the U.S. “global war on terror.” Yet it differs from the United
States in how it processes terror suspects. Unlike the U.S. legal system that
Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, Factsheet: Temporary Passport Seizure, 13.
“Human Rights Watch Concerns and Recommendations on the United Kingdom,”
Human Rights Watch (June 22, 2015), available at:
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/22/human-rights-watch-concerns-andrecommendations-united-kingdom.
58 Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, Factsheet: Temporary Passport Seizure, 13.
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processes the majority of terror suspects using military tribunals at
Guantanamo Bay, the United Kingdom uses its domestic courts to process
terror suspects through the Special Immigration Appeals Commissions
(SIAC). Part II examines the SIAC process and surveys the U.K. judicial
system’s interaction with the European Court of Human Rights.

Part II: UK domestic courts and terrorism & the European
Courts of Human Rights
The Special Immigration Appeals Commission
In the 1970s, cases dealing with terrorism relating to the “Troubles” in
Northern Ireland were held in “Diplock Courts,” named after Lord Diplock,
who first recommended that trials of terror suspects should take place
without juries to prevent the possibility of jury interference and
intimidation.59 Today, domestic courts process most terror related cases.
However, in sensitive situations where national security concerns arise, the
United Kingdom may elect to use the Special Immigration Appeals
Commission (SIAC) process. Established in 1997, the court convenes “behind
closed doors” and allows the government to hold hearings in a secure
environment. Within the court, Closed Material Procedures (CMPs) provide
judges access to secret evidence (evidence sourced from foreign intelligence
services, police, and informants) that is withheld from the defendant and the
public. Once closed materials are released to the judge and the Special
Advocate (a defense lawyer), the Special Advocate’s communication with his
client is limited in time and as to the information that can be shared.60
The court serves a purpose in guarding information that cannot be shared in a
civil court because of the potential detrimental effects that such a release
would have on national security. Still, the secretiveness of the court does
raise questions on its fairness. For instance, a recent Amnesty International
report on SIACs noted that many Special Advocates complained of difficulties
conducting their duties under CMPs. The ability to cross-examine expert
witnesses and the accused is severely hampered, as is the ability to challenge
any evidence that could be contested. Dinah Rose QC provided Amnesty

Roach, Kent, The 9/11 Effect: Comparative Counter-Terrorism (Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University Press, 2011).
60 “Left in the Dark: The Use of Secret Evidence in the United Kingdom,” Amnesty
International Publications (October 15, 2012): 7, available at:
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/EUR45/014/2012/en/.
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International an excellent example of the type of situation faced by Special
Advocates:61
“Suppose an allegation is made that a particular individual attended a
training camp in Afghanistan – this is a SIAC-type example – on a
particular date, was seen there, and there is identification evidence
that describes the individual as having a beard. If you are the special
advocate, you cannot take instructions to find out whether the
claimant had a beard at that date or whether he might have in his
possession any photograph of himself taken at that date showing he
did not have a beard.”62
It is understandable that courts should convene in this way when evidence
made public could threaten the safety of officers or disrupt counter-terrorism
operations. Yet the secrecy surrounding the court begs the question: Is it
worth holding a court at all if it is unbalanced and in favor of the government?
The cycle continues with final judgements wherein, depending on whether a
closed or open judgement is granted, the defendant may only be given a brief
reason for why a case was lost, making the appeal process extremely
frustrating.63
Reform to overzealous legislation has taken place. For example, indefinite
detentions from the ATCSA 2001 were repealed and reconstituted over time
into the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIM), which lets
police monitor suspects while limiting their movement.64 However, reform to
SIACs and the hearing of secret evidence has been slow coming. Not only is
the United Kingdom omitting its responsibilities to provide fairness in its
courts, but it should also be mindful of violating international conventions
like Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) that grant individuals the right to a fair trial.65 Interestingly, the use
of CMPs has moved beyond SIACs and now happens regularly in civil courts
after the passing of the Justice and Security Act of 2013 (JSA 2013). Though

Ibid., 11.
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64 David Barett, “Terror Controls Explained,” The Telegraph (August 27, 2014) available
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not a new concept, expanding into civil courts does emphasize the potential
for “creep” to happen when CMPs become the norm.66
The U.K. government cites that the implementation of the JSA 2013 is
required to protect intelligence shared by the United States, and that failing to
secure information in courts may result in a loss of confidence by the United
States and thus the potential end to the information sharing relationship.67
Despite the ominous sentiment surrounding CMP’s, a favorable aspect of
extending CMPs into civil courts is that many cases that are currently stalled
for the purposes of national security can now be heard–albeit in secret–
allowing justice to run its course.68 At the same time, human rights
proponents aver that CMPs are contrary to Article 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights–the right to a fair trial. Yet, on closer
examination, this right is not guaranteed by the article which states,
“Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be
excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or
national security in a democratic society.”69 Amnesty International also
argues that the disclosure of certain evidence through CMPs rather than the
previous method of using Public Interest Immunity (PII) procedures–which
completely excluded information from both sides–does not provide “effective
remedy,” since material is excluded from the individual concerned–a valid
point.70 Nevertheless, transparency and open justice must be balanced in the
interest of security. To ensure the integrity of the system, judicial reviews
through parliament do take place, while intelligence commissions provide a
robust mechanism to monitor security services for any abuses of power.71 The
ultimate fail safe however is found through the independence of the judiciary,
which is protected from interference under law to ensure that national
security is not used as a ruse to achieve political or nefarious ends.

The European Courts of Human Rights & terror cases
Human rights and security have been hard to balance with today’s terrorist threat,
which is one of the reasons the current U.K. government has publicly stated that it
wishes to amend the European Convention on Human Rights that was adopted
Amnesty International, “Left in the Dark,” 32, 39.
“Justice and Security Green Paper,” HM Government (October, 2011): 8, available at:
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228
860/8194.pdf
68 Ibid., 17.
69 Ibid., 5.
70 Amnesty International, “Left in the Dark,” 38.
71 HM Government, “Justice and Security Green Paper,” xv.
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into British domestic law under the Human Rights Act of 1998.72 Several cases
concerning the extradition or deportation of convicted terrorists have seen British
court rulings blocked from proceeding for violating human rights by the European
Court of Human Rights. One case that stands out is that of Abu Hamza, which
originally led to the current discourse. Abu Hamza, an Egyptian-born cleric, was
notorious for his support of al-Qaida, and the radical preaches he would give
outside of the Finsbury Park Mosque in North London. British security services
monitored his activity for years due to his suspected links to terrorism. He was
eventually arrested and jailed in 2006 for seven years on 11 charges under the TA
2000, including incitement to commit murder and racial hatred. However, it
would be his bid to stop his extradition to the United States for his part in the
kidnapping of four tourists in Yemen in 1998, and his alleged plans to establish a
terrorist training camp in Oregon, that would cause a media frenzy.73 To stop the
extradition, Abu Hamza–along with five others on separate terror charges–
appealed to the European Court of Human Rights. Babar Ahmad and others v.
the United Kingdom argued against extradition on the grounds that their Article 3
human rights would be infringed upon if extradited to the United States, because
of U.S. deviations from international norms concerning torture, and the length of
time they would have to serve in a U.S. “supermax” jail.74
Though this is but one example, the British government and certain media
outlets continue to push the narrative that the United Kingdom’s ability to
counter terrorism is stunted by the Strasbourg court which is why the former
Home Secretary and now Prime Minister, Theresa May, called for Britain to
withdraw from the European Convention on Human Rights.75 Hamza’s court
battle lasted eight years and cost tax payers over a million pounds, while the
European Court of Human Rights deliberated on whether extradition to the
United States would or would not encroach on Hamza’s human rights.76 The
portrayal of this case in the media, and the tendency for media outlets to
focus on extraordinary cases like this one, has garnered within the public the
idea that these types of disputes between the United Kingdom and the
European Court over criminals are commonplace—this is simply not the case.
“The UK Government’s Proposals Regarding the Human Rights Act and the European
Court of Human Rights,” Human Rights Watch, May 20, 2015, available at:
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/05/20/uk-governments-proposals-regardinghuman-rights-act-and-european-court-human-rights.
73 “Babar Ahmad and Abu Hamza Among Terror Suspects to be Sent to US,” BBC News
(October 5, 2012) available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-17662054.
74 Ibid.
75 Human Rights Watch, “The UK Government’s Proposals,”; “UK must leave European
Convention on Human Rights, Says Theresa May,” The Guardian (April 25, 2016)
available at: http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/apr/25/uk-must-leaveeuropean-convention-on-human-rights-theresa-may-eu-referendum.
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at: http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-26737888.
72

44
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2016

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 9, No. 3

For instance, of the “1,243 cases that were brought before the European court
in 2014, only four cases were lost by the U.K. government,” underlining the
misconception.77 The European Court of Human Rights may be an
inconvenience to the United Kingdom, but the European Court’s ability to
challenge U.K. court decisions provides essential accountability and much
needed balance to the ongoing debate between security and human rights.

Conclusion
Strong anti-terror legislation remains a valuable tool in countering terrorism,
and the United Kingdom should continue to pass laws to meet that threat.
Concurrently, the United Kingdom should continue to fine-tune existing laws
that encroach on human rights and liberties beyond a reasonable point, and it
could achieve this by integrating civil society into the legal process. It is clear
that Special Advocates face barriers in effectively carrying out their roles, and
more can be done to ensure the impartiality of SIACs. Aside from working
with civil liberty organizations, the SIAC ought to consider using an
independent adjudicator or judge (with the appropriate security clearances)
to assess whether closed material procedures are being employed
appropriately and fairly in any given trial. Although this does not address the
unbalanced nature of the court in that defendants are still not privy to all the
evidence, having independent adjudication would help ensure a fairer trial
and be another step toward reaching the goal of open justice.
Another issue brought to the fore by the United Kingdom’s far-reaching
counterterrorism legislation is the perception from members of the Muslim
community that such laws normalize racial profiling, and ultimately
encourage the growth of terrorism by isolating the community even further. It
could be said that it is not just the legality of these laws that matter for
national security, but the perception of them and their implementation. One
group in particular, the Muslim Council of Great Britain, who claim to be the
largest Muslim umbrella organization in Britain today, have been most vocal
in expressing their opinion on counter-terror legislation. However, their
often-hardline standpoint on U.K foreign policy and social issues has meant
that the Conservative Party has distanced themselves from the organization
and has been unwilling to work with the them in countering terrorism.78
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Although the MCB condemns terror attacks,79 elements within the MCB have
taken an extremely controversial stance in the past on social issues, from the
boycotting of holocaust memorials to taking an ultra-conservative view on
LGBTQ rights,80 which run contrary to British secular ideals. They have
stated their disapproval at the “glorification of terror” provision that was
passed in 2006, declaring, “the circumscription of dissenting opinion through
the banning of non-violent groups and the implications for expressing
legitimate criticism and condemnation of oppressive regimes and those who
violate international legality.”81 There are clear ideological differences
between members of the British Government and the MCB on how to tackle
terrorism, but closing all dialogue and marginalizing such a large bloc of
Muslim society may be detrimental in the long-run. Regardless of the
conservative leanings within the MCB, the MCB’s wide-reach within the
Muslim community means that it could be a useful ally in fighting
radicalization, and help the government develop policies to better integrate
British Muslims into British society.
Trust and confidence in law-enforcement among Muslim families is also
lacking; suggesting that gaining their support for government counter-terror
efforts will be increasingly difficult unless relations with the police are
improved.82 One way to regain the trust of disaffected communities would be
to increase minority numbers within the police force that currently lacks
diversity within their ranks; this may help émigré communities identify with
police better and encourage greater collaboration in the fight against terror.
Presently, police officers of Muslim faith are not recorded in government
statistics. However, as of 2015, only 5.5% of the police force was recorded as
being members of an ethnic minority, showing that more work needs to be
done in terms of police recruitment. The government should address this
Council of Britain (October 25, 2015) available at: http://www.mcb.org.uk/thegovernment-prevent-and-muslim-communities/.
79 “Position statement: The Muslim Council of Britain and Ahmadis,” The Muslim Council
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https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/30/shuja-shafi-head-muslim-councilbritain-interview.
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issue by working with community outreach initiatives to deliberate on how to
encourage young Muslims to pursue a career in the police force, and then
allocate an appropriate amount of funding for a targeted recruiting campaign
within the Muslim community.
The British vote to leave the EU also brings into question the wider
implication of Brexit on security. In the weeks following the vote, it seems the
far right has been emboldened: Statistics show a 20% spike in racially
motivated hate crimes against visible minorities according to the British
National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC).83 It is extremely important at this
time that law enforcement agencies show a zero-tolerance approach to
perpetrators of hate crimes to prevent the normalization of racist sentiment,
and to prevent a further decline in relations with émigré communities. Longterm, the security relationship with the EU post-Brexit remains to be seen,
but the impact should be limited given the necessity of state cooperation in
defeating terrorism. So far, Britain has not announced any plans to stop
using EU security databases, or to severe ties with Europol. In fact, the
strengthening of cooperation between European states seems more likely
given the recent surge in terror attacks across Europe: The appointment of
the British Ambassador to France, Sir Julian King, as the new EU security
commissioner hints at Europe’s intent to maintain close security ties.84
The appointment of former Home Secretary, Theresa May, to the position of
Prime Minister, means that previous calls by her to withdraw from the
European Court of Human Rights, and for the creation of a British Bill of
Rights may come to fruition given her new mandate. This would be a
mistake. Derogations from the ICCPR, the UN Convention against Torture,
and the European Convention on Human Rights, in the hope of securing
Britain against terrorist activity, will hurt British standing in the world by
damaging its reputation as a model of legislative integrity and human rights
champion. By such action, it will no longer be able to distinguish itself from
that of the authoritarians it claims are anathema to democracy. Leaving the
European Court—which is a separate entity from the European Union—would
“Hate Crime Incidents Reported to Police have Reduced Following a Spike after the EU
Referendum,” National Police Chiefs’ Council (July 22, 2016) available at:
http://news.npcc.police.uk/releases/hate-crime-incidents-reported-to-police-havereduced-following-a-spike-after-the-eu-referendum.
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put the United Kingdom akin to authoritarian Belarus85 in terms of countries
that are not signatories, and would result in the U.K. legislative system losing
a critical redoubt of accountability. The Conservative Party has suggested a
British Bill of Rights, but fears that it may be a watered down version of the
current Human Rights Act are warranted, given the worldwide trend towards
curbing freedoms in the name of security.86 The Human Rights Act of 1998
codified freedom of speech, which had only been assumed under British
common law, now guarantees the British people access to basic rights.
Replacing this law would ultimately negate the rights of the majority in order
to deal with a problematic few in the search for greater security.
The United Kingdom—much like other developed democracies—faces an
uphill struggle balancing human rights and civil liberties with an everchanging security environment. The rise in homegrown extremism, the
ability for homegrown terrorists to travel freely throughout the European
Union, and the flexibility of terrorist operations means that law enforcement
and intelligence agencies have an extremely difficult job in anticipating and
stopping terrorist attacks. The legislative process across the world has
traditionally been slow in managing the rise of non-state actors and keeping
pace with changes in technology, but the United Kingdom has shown the
robust nature of its legal system when it comes to passing anti-terror
legislation. However, to ensure anti-terror laws do not foment extremism, it
is essential that the government engage with the Muslim community during
the policymaking process to prevent further alienation. Some of the laws
detailed in this article have been overzealous and have compromised liberties
and human rights at times to protect the public, but, on balance, have been
necessary to counter terrorist actors. When laws have overstepped their
bounds, constant oversight, the inclusion of periodic reviews, and sunset
clauses have placed draconian laws firmly into check.
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